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[New] Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd#5982

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Samirbous merged 11 commits into
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auditd_k8
May 3, 2026
Merged

[New] Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd#5982
Samirbous merged 11 commits into
mainfrom
auditd_k8

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@Samirbous

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Detects Auditd opened-file reads on sensitive root and cluster paths (Kubernetes token mounts, kubelet and admin kubeconfig, PKI material, shadow, root SSH keys, root cloud CLI and Docker config) when the process looks like common copy or scripting utilities or the binary runs from temp or run staging. User home paths are excluded so file watches stay explicit and aligned with auditd:

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Detects Auditd opened-file reads on sensitive root and cluster paths (Kubernetes token mounts, kubelet and admin kubeconfig, PKI material, shadow, root SSH keys, root cloud CLI and Docker config) when the process looks like common copy or scripting utilities or the binary runs from temp or run staging. User home paths are excluded so file watches
stay explicit and aligned with auditd:
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Rule: New - Guidelines

These guidelines serve as a reminder set of considerations when proposing a new rule.

Documentation and Context

  • Detailed description of the rule.
  • List any new fields required in ECS/data sources.
  • Link related issues or PRs.
  • Include references.

Rule Metadata Checks

  • creation_date matches the date of creation PR initially merged.
  • min_stack_version should support the widest stack versions.
  • name and description should be descriptive and not include typos.
  • query should be inclusive, not overly exclusive, considering performance for diverse environments. Non ecs fields should be added to non-ecs-schema.json if not available in an integration.
  • min_stack_comments and min_stack_version should be included if the rule is only compatible starting from a specific stack version.
  • index pattern should be neither too specific nor too vague, ensuring it accurately matches the relevant data stream (e.g., use logs-endpoint.process-* for process data).
  • integration should align with the index. If the integration is newly introduced, ensure the manifest, schemas, and new_rule.yaml template are updated.
  • setup should include the necessary steps to configure the integration.
  • note should include any additional information (e.g. Triage and analysis investigation guides, timeline templates).
  • tags should be relevant to the threat and align/added to the EXPECTED_RULE_TAGS in the definitions.py file.
  • threat, techniques, and subtechniques should map to ATT&CK always if possible.

New BBR Rules

  • building_block_type should be included if the rule is a building block and the rule should be located in the rules_building_block folder.
  • bypass_bbr_timing should be included if adding custom lookback timing to the rule.

Testing and Validation

  • Provide evidence of testing and detecting the expected threat.
  • Check for existence of coverage to prevent duplication.

@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented Apr 24, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented Apr 24, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented Apr 24, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented Apr 25, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

…identity_file_open.toml

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented May 1, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

Samirbous and others added 2 commits May 2, 2026 13:31
Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented May 2, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented May 2, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented May 2, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented May 2, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented May 2, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

@tradebot-elastic

tradebot-elastic commented May 2, 2026

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⛔️ Test failed

Results
  • ❌ Sensitive Identity File Open by Suspicious Process via Auditd (kuery)
    • coverage_issue: no_rta
    • stack_validation_failed: no_rta

@Samirbous Samirbous merged commit bf49a90 into main May 3, 2026
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@Samirbous Samirbous deleted the auditd_k8 branch May 3, 2026 10:24
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5 participants